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µ7KHVN\LVQRWDFRZ¶: interpreting religion beyond the propositional frame. 
 
In her editorial for a special virtual issue of the Journal of Philosophy of Education on 
µ5HOLJLRQDQG(GXFDWLRQ¶$QQD6WUKDQKDVRIIHUHGDFRQFLVH\HWFRPSUHKHQVLYHRYHUYLHZRI
the diverse range of debates that have preoccupied discussions of the relations between 
religion and education over recent decades. What is striking about her account, and Strhan 
hints at this in the closing paragraph of the editorial, is how discussions within philosophy of 
education have presupposed that the belief dimension of religion is the core of religious life, 
to the exclusion of almost everything else, thDW³WKHZD\LQZKLFKUHOLJLRQKDVEHHQWKHRULVHG
LQSDUWLFXODUWKHIRFXVRQLQGRFWULQDWLRQKDVSULYLOHJHGWKHHTXDWLRQRIUHOLJLRQZLWKEHOLHI´
(Strhan 2014).  
The privileging of belief LVHYLGHQWIRUH[DPSOHLQ0LFKDHO+DQG¶VUHSO\WR7UHYRU&RROLQJ¶V 
argument about the marginalization of religion within education. Here associating belief with 
WKHLGHDRID³WKHRU\RIWKHPHDQLQJRIOLIH´RUDZRUOGYLHZ+DQGVWDWHV 
Theories of the meaning of life need not be religious, and a religion need not 
include a theory of the meaning of life. But, at least in the case of the major 
world religions, religious commitment typically does involve subscription to 
VXFK D WKHRU\ ,W LV DSSURSULDWH WR VSHDN RI D µ&KULVWLDQ ZRUOGYLHZ¶ IRU
example, because the core Christian narrative of the creation, fall and 
redemption of humanity is plausibly construed as an account of the 
significance, origin and purpose of human existence (Hand 2012, 529).  
This subscription to a theory of the meaning of life assumes that doctrines and beliefs can be 
interpreted as propositions. Even more explicitly in reference to the propositional nature of 
UHOLJLRXV EHOLHIV +DQG VWDWHV WKDW ³[t]he differences between the followers of different 
religious and irreligious paths are fundamentally differences of belief: the followers assent to 
GLIIHUHQWSURSRVLWLRQVDERXWZKDWWKHZRUOGLVOLNH´+DQG+DQG¶VEURDGFRQFHUQ
seems to be with the explicit consistency and justification of any worldview so that the 
relation between a worldview and education may or may not be rationally justified.1 Schools 
WKDWSURPRWHZRUOGYLHZVFRQVLGHUHGHSLVWHPLFDOO\FRQWURYHUVLDODUHDSUREOHP³IDLWKVFKRROV
DUH REMHFWLRQDEOH EHFDXVH WKH\ DWWHPSW WR VHFXUH FKLOGUHQ¶V DVVHQW WR HSLVWHPLFDOO\
FRQWURYHUVLDOSURSRVLWLRQV´+DQG+DQG¶VSULYLOHJLQJRISUopositional belief and 
worldview in framing religion is, as Strhan suggests, typical within debates across educational 
philosophy. In what follows I argue that this approach is problematic primarily because it 
significantly misrepresents the nature of religious life. Framed propositionally, the kinds of 
debates across education are those to do with indoctrination or rights (e.g. of the rights 
Catholic parents have to bring up their children in Catholic the tradition), and this 
significantly impedes our understanding religious life and its relation to education. 
                                                        
1 +DQGµV concern here is to present two JHQHUDOFRQFHSWLRQVRIWKHWHUPµZRUOGYLHZ¶, first as a theory 
of the world and/or meaning, and second, as a conceptual scheme that makes experience possible at all, 
VXFKDV.DQW¶VFDWHJRULHV+DQGGRHVQRWSUHVHQWHLWKHUDVFRUUHFWWKRXJKILQGVWKHIRUPHUWREH
consistent with the idea of holding a religious worldview), but rather wants to show that these two 
senses are conflated by Cooling. I present this here to draw attention to a characteristic framing of the 
concept of worldview as a theory of things which Hand does appear happier to attach to many religions 
(Hand 2012, 531). However, I do not believe these two conceptions of worldview can be kept quite as 
distinct as Hand suggests because our conceptual scheme forms what Taylor calls our social imaginary 
which itself has an impact, albeit at a subliminal level, on our general view of reality and what 
meanings we ascribe to things in the world. This is clearer where Hand goes on to suggest that some 
agnostic people opt out of having a theory about the world ± a worldview. If agnostic people avoid 
KDYLQJDWKHRU\RIWKHZRUOGWKH\VWLOOKDYHDQµRULHQWDWLRQ¶Wo reality which, in the terms of my 
argument, has greater impact upon religious life. 
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Framing religion otherwise 
,Q WKH¶V1LQLDQ6PDUWSLRQHHUHG5HOLJLRXV6WXGLHVDVDVXEMHFWIRUXQLYHUVLW\UHVHDUFK
and teaching distinct from the more confessional Theology or Divinity. An important part of 
his work was to identify seven dimensions of religion: doctrinal, mythological, ethical, ritual, 
experiential, institutional, and material (Smart 1999). It cannot be denied that doctrine is an 
essential aspect of religious understanding for many practitioners. 2  6PDUW¶V LQIOXHQWLDO
understanding of world religions led him to recognize that in the West, the religions of the 
book, also known as the Abrahamic religions (Judaism, Christianity, and Islam) since they 
share the Hebrew Bible, have encouraged Western scholars to interpret other religions 
through the doctrinal/ propositional lens. The real legacy of this Western lens is the tendency 
to reduce religions to propositions, truth claims, or worldviews. Educationalists are 
preoccupied with how competing worldviews should be handled, or to what extent 
transmission of worldviews is justified. These debates would be framed differently were they 
addressing the foods eaten, clothes worn, or languages spoken by different traditions. 
Bringing up a child as a vegetarian, the norm across much of the Indian subcontinent, would 
hardly be considered indoctrination. The suggestion that foods can have religious significance 
might sound reductive in a different way ± WKDWZHWHDFKUHOLJLRQWKURXJKH[SHULHQFHRIµVDULV
DQGVDPRVDV¶LVRIWHQFLWHGDVWULYLDOL]LQJRWKHUFXOWXUHV± but Hindu families take food to be 
an extremely important expression of religious identity and social bonds. It seems to be the 
presumption that beliefs or worldviews entail an intellectual or cognitive dimension, and that 
this dimension is the core of religious life, which makes requiring religious assent of the child 
µLQGRFWULQDWLRQ¶UDWKHUWKDQMXVWVRFLDOL]DWLRQ 
In contrast to this it is my contention that for many religious practitioners, beliefs will be 
unreflectively assumed and therefore less important than is often assumed. Many religious 
SUDFWLFHV LQ ,QGLD DQG &KLQD IRU H[DPSOH ZKLFK PLJKW EH FDWHJRUL]HG DV µ+LQGX¶ RU
µ%XGGKLVW¶WKRXJKWKHVHWHUPVDUHQRWXQFRQWURYHUVLDODPRQJVFKRODUVRIUHOLJLRQPD\KDYH
ethical, experiential and material significance for the practitioners, but ask the practitioner 
about why they perform the rituals they do, and the answer may well be suffused with 
symbolism, or quite possibly be just unclear or irrelevant. There is scarcely a consistent and 
affirmative metDSK\VLFV RU µWKHRU\ RI WKH ZRUOG¶ EHKLQG D puja in which prayer, song and 
ritual are performed to bless a newly purchased car on the streets of Bangalore, for example. 
The puja rituals are ostensibly to host, honour or worship one or more deities, but the rituals 
VHHP XQUHODWHG WR GRFWULQDO WKHRORJ\ RU ZRUOGYLHZ LQ +DQG¶V VHQVH RI WKH WHUP :KHQ
considering the gods of the Hindu pantheon it is better to wonder at their significance than to 
argue for or against their existence. It could be argued, therefore, that Hindu devotional rituals 
offer practices rather than metaphysics. For this reason, Hindus can follow dharma (duty or 
law3) without dogma and can, therefore, simultaneously follow Christ, for example.4 
                                                        
2 It would also be a mistake to assume doctrine to only exist as regulative and propositional. The term 
µGoctrine¶RULJLQDOO\UHIHUVWRteaching which can be interpreted more as a process. Thus doctrines do 
not need to be reduced to propositions, but can act to give shape, rather than directly regulate belief. 
3 The concept of dharma is used by Hindus, Buddhists, Sikhs and Jains and is translated in various 
ZD\VLQFOXGLQJWRGRRQH¶VGXW\WREHYLUWXRXVRUWKHULJKWZD\WROLYH7KDWIRUPVRIWKHWHUPFXW
across a range of religious traditions further reinforces my argument that religious identity is porous 
and flexible, and does not rest upon specific, still less exclusive, propositional truth claims. 
4 Of course Hinduism, if it even exists as an identifiable religion (Smith 1962), is a diverse community 
of practitioners and practices. In particular the Bhakti traditions prioritize devotional aspects of 
religious practice. This is not to say that there is no metaphysics. The Bhakti tradition often identified 
with Shaivism in which the god Shiva is revered as the supreme being. My point is that even in modern 
Shaivism the metaphysics really seems to withdraw in significance. 
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In contemporary India (and across the world) the picture is complex due to the social capital 
that different religious commitments confer, whether that is Caste capital, or the economic 
DQGFXOWXUDODGYDQWDJHVWKDWVRPH'DOLWXQWRXFKDEOH+LQGX¶VSHUFHLYHZLWKLQFRQYHUVLRQWR
Christianity. While complex, the basic message for my argument from Hindu culture is that 
on the whole doctrines and worldviews play little role in defining religious identity. This 
distance from doctrine and worldview is not only characteristic of Hinduism, forming a 
significant part of most religious lives, where we distinguish the traditions contained in 
ZULWLQJVIURPWKHUHOLJLRXVOLYHVRIWKHµIDLWKIXO¶But what about the more explicitly doctrinal, 
creedal, and dogmatic Christian religion which is generally taken to be the largest religion in 
the world? 
 
Cultural Liturgies 
-DPHV6PLWK¶VZULWLQJVRQµOLWXUJ\¶ (which for Smith is roughly synonymous with worship) 
show that the propositional or worldview conception of religion does not do justice to the 
power and meaning of Christian liturgies. Drawing together Christian theology, philosophy, 
DQGHGXFDWLRQDOWKHRU\6PLWK¶VEDVLFYLHZLVWKDWWKH&KULVWLDQUHOLJLRQLVILUVWDQGIRUHPRVWD
set of formative practices. That formative process addresses us less at the cognitive level of 
worldviews than is often assumed. Religious liturgies are, then, inherently educational: those 
liturgical practices, ³ZKHWKHU µVDFUHG¶ RU µVHFXODU¶²shape and constitute our identities by 
IRUPLQJRXUPRVWEDVLFDWWXQHPHQWWRWKHZRUOG´6PLWK5). Note that, for Smith it is 
QRW RQO\ µUHOLJLRQV¶ WKDW enact formative liturgies. All kinds of identity are shaped through 
liturgical practices, whether or not they are explicitly µUHOLJLRXV¶7KHSRLQWIRU6PLWKLVWKDW
we generally do not recognize secular practices as formative liturgies that shape and transmit 
identity because we take the secular domain to be value-IUHH2QHFRQVHTXHQFHRI6PLWK¶V
DUJXPHQW LV WKDW ³WKHUH LV QR VXFK WKLQJ DV D µVHFXODU¶ HGXFDWLRQ´ 6PLWK   LQ WKH
sense that all kinds of educational practice entail an orientation to the world which is imbued 
with something fundamental to religions everywhere: liturgical practices. 
To illustrate the power of secular liturgies, Smith presents the habit of visiting a shopping 
mall in which ritual performances structure the experience and shape the desires of the 
shoppers (Smith 2009, 18-,WLVWKHHIIHFWLYHVKDSLQJRIKXPDQGHVLUHVWKDWPDNHV6PLWK¶V
interest educational as much as theological. In the mall, as in Western culture more broadly, 
consumerism coheres around consumerist liturgies. Icons are visible here: celebrity 
advertising presents the good life that many of us aspire to, seeking not to convince us of the 
consistency or rationality of its ideals, but appealing to the imagination. The shoppers receive 
WKLVYLVLRQRIWKHJRRGDV« 
«D UHOLJLRXV SURFODPDWLRQ WKDW GRHV QRW WUDIILF LQ DEVWUDFWHG LGHDOV RU UXOHV RU
doctrines, but rather offers the imagination pictures and statues and moving images. 
While other religions are promising salvation through the thin, dry media of books 
and messages, this new global religion is offering embodied pictures of the redeemed 
that invite us to imagine ourselves in their shoes (Smith 2009, 21). 
From this point of view, the distinction between secular and sacred liturgy is not clear-cut. 
This suggests that our everyday practices enact a way of being-in-the-world which cannot be 
straight-forwardly separated from religion. The ways in which our everyday activities are 
liturgical, suggest that those activities orient our desires. Indeed that is the point of the 
shopping mall, that our desires are oriented towards the acquisition of more stuff. For Smith, 
Christian liturgy is oriented in a different direction: towards God.  
6PLWK¶V DUJXPHQW LV UHminiscent of that developed by the theologian Paul Tillich. Tillich 
argued that faith is less about the intellectual or cognitive content of beliefs than with our 
ultimate concern, a concern which grasps us as much as we grasp it (Tillich 1964, 8). Both 
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TiOOLFK DQG 6PLWK VHH ZRUVKLS RSHUDWLQJ DW D OHYHO WKDW PLJKW EH VHHQ DV SDUW RI RXU µSUH-
XQGHUVWDQGLQJ¶RUIUDPLQJRIWKHZRUOGERWKWKLQNHUVRZHDQLQWHOOHFWXDOGHEWWR+HLGHJJHULQ
this and other respects). The significance of this is that liturgy or concern happens whether we 
OLNH LW RUQRW UDWKHU OLNH+HLGHJJHU¶VQRWLRQRIFDUH ± Sorge ± DV WKH VWUXFWXUHRI'DVHLQ¶V
being-in-the-world). This disrupts the notion of religion as a choice or decision, as well as 
disrupting the propositional /worldview conception of religion since it is, in a sense, pre-
cognitive. Like Smith, Tillich was skeptical of the voluntarist conception of religious life, 
which tends to frame religion in terms of making choices between competing worldviews. 
Tillich regarded other concerns (e.g. political, social or moral concerns, or indeed personal 
interests and consumerist concerns) as preliminary or provisional and understood that 
preliminary concerns could be ± mistakenly ± treated as ultimate. Tillich applies the term 
idolatry to the elevation of a provisional concern to ultimate status (Tillich 1967, vol 1, 13ff.). 
In other words, where we stake our lives on a successful career with financial rewards, then 
we effectively worship the provisional as though it were ultimate. It is the continuity between 
secular and religious concerns in Tillich and Smith that is important here.5 Clearly then, 
religion is not just what we do on Sundays, or what we say we believe in propositional terms, 
our theory of the world. It is these things but a lot more that is less visible and less cognitive. 
Equally the religious nature of a school, for example, is not easily defined as though it can be 
contained within a mission statement, or the church attendance of its staff or students. 
The reader might be tempted to reply that the consequence of my argument is that since 
everyone is engaged in some kind of liturgy, then everyone is effectively religious - a pretty 
meaningless proposition! My provisional reply would be only that I am not ultimately 
interested in establishing a correct propositional claim about the nature of religious life and its 
connection to education. To say that everyone is religious, while not being straightforwardly 
true, can offer some useful insight in certain contexts (where people do not recognize that any 
way of life is deeply value-laden), so it is less a general truth claim than a device. It is a useful 
device within Hindu thought to suggest that we are all devoted to something, we had just 
better be conscious of our devotional practices, rather than let the market dictate them, and 
hence ritual practices are there to bring attention to and shape our devotional life. At a more 
subtle level, the reader should note that my argument speaks not only to issues around 
religious epistemology /ontology but seems inevitably to raise general epistemological 
/ontological questions about commitment and belief in general. There is a subtle shift here: 
from seeing religious commitments as propositional truth claims, to seeing commitments as 
forming and formed by religious practices. This notion of practicing doctrine is interestingly 
reflected in Rowan Williams¶ reservations about the reduction of religious life to a set of 
propositions: 
All the major historic faiths, even Islam, which is closest to the propositional model 
at first sight, assume in their classical forms an interaction between forms of self-
imaging and self-interpreting, through prayer and action, and the formal language of 
belief; that language works not simply to describe an external reality, but to modify 
over time the way self and world are sensed. (Williams 2012, 16).  
,QRWKHUZRUGVWKHFODVVLFDOSURSRVLWLRQVDQGFUHHGVRIUHOLJLRXVWUDGLWLRQVDUHWREHµSUDFWLFHG¶
more than taken to be true (or false) propositions. There is, then, a philosophy of language 
built into this relation which rejects that correspondence view in which terms stand for objects. 
Language is performative more than propositional. This again affirms the point that this 
philosophy of religion also entails an examination of ontology and epistemology. 
6PLWK¶VDFFRXQWHQJDJHVPRUHGLUHFWO\ZLWK WKHTXHVWLRQRIHGXFDWLRQDERXWZKLFK WKHUH LV
more to say. The point here is that the way liturgies are enacted has little to do with the 
                                                        
5 ,WLVZRUWKQRWLQJWKDW6PLWKKLPVHOIFODLPVKLVSRVLWLRQ³KDVQRWUXFN´6PLWKQZLWK
7LOOLFKLDQFODLPVDURXQGXOWLPDWHFRQFHUQIRUWKHUHDVRQWKDW7LOOLFK¶VXOWLPDWHUHIHUHQFHSRLQW,QRW
SOXUDOLVWDV6PLWK¶VSRVLWLRQLV 
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adoption of a belief system, a set of truth claims, or a worldview. This is why Smith, 
employing the language of Charles Taylor, goes on to argue for the primacy of worship over 
ZRUOGYLHZ LQ WKH IRUPDWLRQ RI GHVLUH ³LW PLJKW Ee more helpful to talk about a Christian 
social imaginary than to focus on a Christian worldview, given that the latter seems tinged 
ZLWKDOLQJHULQJFRJQLWLYLVP´6PLWK6RIRU6PLWKWKHIRUPDWLRQRIGHVLUHVKDSHV
our being-in-the-world at a level that is ontologically prior to the decisions we make as 
religious or non-religious subjects. Our intentions precede our actions, but those intentions are 
themselves shaped by formative practices. Stated bluntly, all actions are liturgical, just as all 
actions are educational. The question for Smith is this: how are our varied liturgies forming 
us? What kind of being-in-the-world is developed in the liturgical practices of the present 
consumerist age?  
 
Formations of freedom  
Both secular and religious liturgies contain within them a conception of the good life. The 
secular liturgy of the shopping mall inculcates a culture into lifestyle habits more perniciously, 
perhaps, than religious indoctrination. I say this because the religious liturgies are, at least, 
framed as formative practices, whereas secular liturgies hide behind the appearance of 
freedom of choice: the indoctrination of secular liturgies employs the desires of apparently 
autonomous individuals who regard themselves as free to choose (between one brand and 
another). Smith finds that the conceptions of freedom and autonomy embodied in consumerist 
liturgies also conceal the enframed nature of the choices before us. How often to we see 
adverts for perfumes, for example, telling stories of breaking out of conventions and 
EHFRPLQJ µIUHH¶" As Smith notes, our modern conceptions of liberty are more or less 
universal in their rejection of teleological conceptions of the good life. Traditions that attempt 
to shape desire towards the good life, for example, the Platonic or Christian traditions, are 
objectionable because they impose a heteronomous vision of the good life. A heteronomous 
vision of the good is almost inconceivable today simply because it opposes of autonomy 
which KDV EHFRPH WKH OLEHUDO µXOWLPDWH FRQFHUQ¶ 7KH PDWHULDO EHQHILWV RI PRGHUQLW\ DUH
profound, but perhaps the greatest achievement is that sense of individual liberty and choice 
over the kind of life one wishes to live. Indeed our education system today places this 
libertarian conception of autonomy at its core: the goal of education is often taken to be the 
successful transition from dependency to autonomy (Brighouse 2009). One could argue that it 
is precisely this goal of autonomy which distinguishes our modern education system from 
pre-modern initiation, inculcation or indoctrination. With this concept of freedom installed 
within our social imaginary certain problems and questions present themselves to educational 
theorists: the rights of parents seem to be in competition with the rights of the child with 
UHVSHFW WR µOLIH FKRLFHV¶ WKH ULJKW RI WKH VWDWH WR LPSRVH D SDUWLFXODU IRUP RI FRPPRQ
schooling is in tension with the individual choices of parents and their children. These debates 
might then explore thH SRLQW DW ZKLFK WKH FKLOG¶V UDWLRQDOLW\ LV VXIILFLHQWO\ GHYHORSHG WR
challenge the authoritative rationality of the parents, or where the limits of state authority 
over individual freedoms lie. These examples seem, broadly speaking, to reflect that well-
known Hobbesian ontology, in which the fundamental condition of human subjects is to be at 
war with each other. From the perspective of freedom as radical autonomy, a genuinely 
common good where interests can be shared rather than simply sublimated or repressed is 
almost inconceivable. 
Theologically speaking, the opposition between autonomy and heteronomy is fallacious since 
it presupposes that divine law and personal freedom must be opposed. The general theological 
view, often regarded as paradoxical, sees personal freedom as only realized when aligned 
with divine law. Various attempts to mediate this polarity exist, such as the Kantian paradox 
EHWZHHQ LQGLYLGXDO DXWRQRP\ DQG WKH PRUDO ODZ 7LOOLFK¶V DWWHPSWV WR GHPRQVWUDWH D
continuity between freedom and destiny (Tillich 1967, Vol 1, 185) 6PLWK¶V DUJXPHQW
develops a similar account of freedom which questions the radical autonomy of the individual 
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subject. He suggests that modern secular liturgies form within us this sense of freedom, 
making any other conception of freedom, such as that entailing the submission or negation of 
the self, hard to conceive. The concepts of freedom and autonomy, imposed and reinforced by 
the secular liturgies within the consumerist culture of late modernity, are not recognized as 
historically or culturally contingent inventions or constructions, but are taken to be the human 
condition. In philosophical terms we are condemned to be free, having no ultimate law but the 
nihilistic will of our own making. Some accounts of philosophical and intellectual history 
seek to inform us of that context and educate us of the contingency of our view of subjective 
freedom. But these narratives largely operate at the propositional level, and so one wonders 
how they can compete against the secular liturgies that convince us of our freedoms in more 
imaginative ways. Our religious traditions offer imaginative µFRXQWHU-OLWXUJLHV¶ZKLFK6PLWK
is keen to draw attention to. 
$VZHKDYHVHHQWKHWHUPVRIWKLVGHEDWHSDUWLFXODUO\µUHOLJLRQ¶DQGµEHOLHI¶DUHFRPSOH[DQG
contested. There is reason to suppose that these terms act as devices, or abstractions, 
indicating a range of practices and presuppositions that for the most part are embedded in the 
lifeworld of communities. ,VWKHUHHYHQVXFKDWKLQJDVµ+LQGXLVP¶WKHZRUGRULJLQDOO\XVHG
to refer to communities East of the Indus river?6 Where modernity raises questions about 
those beliefs and practices, they come to the fore as claims that seem to require rational 
justification. Whole schools of modern theology have sprung up whose chief concern is to 
seek some kind of reconciliation between the changes in worldview from Copernicus to the 
present. These events, bound up as they are with secularization more broadly, have shifted 
RXUJHQHUDOYLHZRIZKDWZHPHDQZKHQZHVSHDNRIUHOLJLRQ5HOLJLRQDVµEHOLHIV\VWHPV¶
then begins to seem like a reasonable shorthand for religious life. With this shift we are also 
compelled to examLQH ZKHWKHU RQH EHOLHI V\VWHP LV µEHWWHU¶ WKDQ DQRWKHU ZKLFK LV PRUH
ethical?; which brings about greater happiness?; which is more µSODXVLEOH¶ RU µGHIHQVLEOH¶"
These questions are not neutral inquiries. They frame our thinking about the nature of religion 
and its place in education and provide the context in which we seek to separate private 
religious practice from shared public life. That different worldviews need to be, in some sense 
respected or reconciled is one logical outcome, and the classroom is one place in which 
various forms of respect and reconciliation might be tested. No wonder then, that 
educationalists often seek to sharply distinguish religion from education, as in French laws of 
laïcité where the division between public and private in state education is robustly upheld.  
Other historical processes also play into the division between private and public. The 
establishment of state-funded schooling in the 19th and 20th centuries across much of Europe 
cannot be understood apart from the Enlightenment legacy of the 18th century in which 
education was often aligned with the promotion of rationality and empiricism. As the Age of 
Reason took hold, so did the philosophy of positivism, a view of the world in part shaped our 
current view of religion. We can, then, link the conception of religion as set of beliefs or 
propositional truth claims and the secular move to separate private and public. The privileging 
of belief over other dimensions of religious life rests upon a broadly positivist ontology and 
epistemology in which truth is accessible in propositional statements interpreted through 
reason and logic. This positivism ± its history and contingency ± should be more widely 
acknowledged than it is since it forecloses alternative conceptions of the relations of religion 
and education.  
 
The propositional frame 
Echoing Taylor, I call the framing of religion in terms of doctrines and propositions the 
µSURSRVLWLRQDO IUDPH¶ $V DOUHDG\ QRWHG WKH SURSRVLWLRQDO IUDPH ZRUNV VXEOLPLQDOO\ WR
                                                        
6 The view that FRQFHSWRIµUHOLJLRQ¶LVDSHFXOLDUO\(XURSHDQFRQVWUXFWLRQRIUHFHQWRULJLQKDVEHHQ
strongly argued by Wilfred Cantwell Smith (1962). 
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structure our thinking on the subject, and there are reasons for this identification of religion 
with doctrine. Much of this work is undertaken by philosophers and theorists who are 
ZRUNLQJZLWKLQ D:HVWHUQ µFXOWXUDOO\&KULVWLDQ¶FRQWH[W LQZKLFK WKHSURSRsitional view of 
religion is WKHQRUP'HVSLWH-DPHV6PLWK¶VVWURQJDFFRXQW, would not deny that the history 
of Latin Christianity could plausibly be read as a history of belief and doctrine, where 
disputations, inquisitions and creedal formulations take propositional form. But we have 
noted that there are many dimensions to religion beyond the notion of belief systems. I now 
turn to another respected religious studies scholar who further disabuses us of the 
propositional conception of religion. 
Wilfred Cantwell Smith argues that the idea that believing is religiously important is a 
PRGHUQ LGHD WKDW ³D JUHDW PRGHUQ KHUHV\ RI WKH FKXUFK LV WKH KHUHV\ RI EHOLHYLQJ´ 6PLWK
JRHV RQ WR VD\ WKDW LV LW WKH µDQWL-UHOLJLRXV¶ WKLQNHUV ZKR KROG ³HYHQ PRUH GRJJHGO\ Whan 
WKHRORJLDQV WKDW EHOLHYLQJ LV ZKDW UHOLJLRXV SHRSOH SULPDULO\ GR´ 6PLWK  Y +H
illustrates his point with the example of the ancient-Egyptians, a highly sophisticated culture 
RISHRSOHZKREHOLHYHGWKDW³WKHVN\LVDFRZ´:LWKWKHEHQHILWV of modern science we 
now know that the sky is not a cow. But were the Egyptians plain wrong? The question is not 
whether the Egyptians were right or wrong, but what they meant by this idea.  
, DP VHULRXVO\ VXJJHVWLQJ WKDW WKH DQFLHQW (J\SWLDQV¶ DSSUHKHQVLon of their 
environment evidenced in and made possible through such statements may well have 
been²however partially or poetically²of a reality that is indeed there. My guess is 
that they perceived something about the sky, about animals, about themselves, and 
about the relations among these, that Ayer and his friends have missed (Smith 1998, 
14). 
Smith is, of course, referencing the reductive dismissals by the logical positivists for which 
Ayer stands as totem. Smith analyses a number of key terms: opinion, creed, faith, and belief, 
in order to develop a convincing case that the term believing does not, in fact, primarily refer 
to holding propositionalist opinions about states of affairs (41ff). To believe is related to the 
German belieben which, signifying love (German Liebe; Latin libido), PHDQV³WRKROGGHDU´
RU³WRSUL]H´HYRNLQJVHQVHVRIOR\DOW\DQGIDLWKIXOQHVVIXUWKHULQGLFDWLQJWKDWµIDLWK¶UHIHUV
to a commitment of the heart rather than assenting without evidence). These linguistic 
associations are alive in present day English. ,IWKHSULPHPLQLVWHULPSORUHVXVWRµ%HOLHYHLQ
%ULWDLQ¶DVWKHHOHFWLRQDSSURDFKHVRUDWHDFKHUHQFRXUDJHVDVWXGHQWWREHOLHYHLQKHUVHOILQ
DGYDQFH RI WKH H[DP WKH XVDJH RI EHOLHI LV LQ $XVWLQ¶V WHUPV SHUIRUPDWLYH UDWher than 
representational. Thus believing, especially in its verbal form does not need to be equated 
with assenting to propositions about, for example, the existence of God. Wilfred Cantwell 
Smith, Charles Taylor, James Smith and Rowan Williams all share the desire to problematize 
the common sense idea that religious beliefs correspond with propositional truth claims. And 
if this propositional view of religion is a straw man within philosophy of religion, it is not so 
in philosophy of education.  
My target here is the common sense nature of certain views, not the idea that beliefs can be 
propositional per se. It would be disingenuous to suggest that there is nothing intellectual or 
cognitive at stake in debates between religious and other worldviews, that scientific 
discoveries had no substantial impact upon religious beliefs. Some theologians regard the 
modern discoveries of science as reawakening a sense of the real contribution that theology 
can make: not in competition with science, but by raising questions about the meaning of 
science as such.7 Such discussions are beyond my scope. My intention here is to question the 
propositional framing of religion as the way to think about the relations religion and 
education. More importantly, I am concerned that we no longer notice the common sense 
nature of the propositional framing of religion.  
                                                        
7 The best exponent of a theology that synthesizes science and religion is the French priest and 
paleontologist Pierre Teilhard de Chardin. 
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Alongside the propositional view of religion, I strongly take issue with the view of history as 
the inexorable rise of enlightened secularism. For this Whig history, which regards 
secularization as an inevitable outcome of modern science, industrialization and democratic 
state politics, needs to come to terms with the fact that religion is a pervasive and ongoing 
influence. This progressivism suits one narrative of modernity, the mainstay of sociological 
theories of secularization that Taylor is particularly keen to denounce: namely the subtractive 
view. This subtractive view sees rationality replacing superstition, naturalistic explanations 
replacing theological or spiritual forces, and the world becoming progressively disenchanted 
IROORZLQJ:HEHU¶VWKHVLV,QWKLVDFFRXQWWKHUHPRYDORIIDLWKDQGWKHVXEVHTXHQWVHSDUDWLRQ
RIFKXUFKDQGVWDWHVKRXOGOHDGWRD³]RQHRIDEVHQFH´:DUQHUVanAntwerpen, and Calhoun 
2010, 8) in which neutral secular reason should be employed to structure social institutions in 
non-partisan terms. But this neutral zone, often framed as the private sphere, turns out to 
privilege those for whom religious life has no meaning. Far from being neutral, such forms of 
secularism appear to some commentators as doing violence to certain expressions of religious 
faith.8 7D\ORU¶VDFFRXQWRQWKHRWKHUKDQGWHQGVWREHPRUHFLUFXPVSHFWGHILQLQJVHFXODULVP
as something of a productive process, in contrast to a subtractive one. What is important for 
my argument is that the subtractive view which sees autonomous reason in terms of universal 
rationality and self-GHWHUPLQDWLRQWKDWLVLQWHQVLRQZLWKUHOLJLRXVFRPPLWPHQWVKDV³VXQNWR
WKHOHYHORIFRPPRQVHQVH´7D\ORUDQGVRLVSDUWRIWKHDVVXmed backdrop of our 
ZRUOGYLHZRUZKDW7D\ORUFDOOVRXU³VRFLDOLPDJLQDU\´6PLWK7KLV:KLJKLVWRU\
has informed the social imaginary of educational culture inasmuch as we tend to see the 
trajectory of human life in developmental terms, and this narrative forms part of the critical 
and emancipatory view of the child just as much as of the society. The influence of this 
developmental assumption and the progressivist narrative attached to it should be critically 
examined. But this can only happen when the presumed notion of what it means to be rational 
± itself part of the social imaginary - becomes questionable. In other words, only through 
bringing into question what has become common sense ± progressivism and religion as 
proposition ± can we begin to reimagine the proper role of religion in public life, and in 
education specifically. Then perhaps we will not begin with the assumption that religion is a 
µSUREOHP¶IRUHGXFDWLRQ6WUKDQ 
 
Conclusion 
We began with reference to the debate between Trevor Cooling and Michael Hand and return 
to it again to further illustrate the subliminal operation of the propositional frame. Of course 
+DQG¶V SURSRVLWLRQDO IUDPLQJ RI UHOLJLRQ GRHV QRW QHFHVVLWDWH DQ RXWULJKW UHMHFWLRQ RI LW
³>V@RPHUHOLJLRXVSURSRsitions are sufficiently well supported by evidence and argument as to 
PHULWVHULRXVFRQVLGHUDWLRQE\UHDVRQDEOHSHRSOH´+DQG$OWKRXJK+DQG¶VYLHZ
of religion is rather more reductive than many others, if we expect Cooling to take a more 
nuanced view of the matter we might be disappointed. It is true that Cooling does not agree 
with Hand that education should EH ³VKDSHG RQO\ E\ QHXWUDO REMHFWLYH VHFXODU WKLQNLQJ´
(Cooling 2010, 24). At first glance Cooling would appear to support my argument since he 
supports a role for religion within education. Cooling believes that education cannot be 
QHXWUDOVLQFH³EHOLHIVLQFOXGLQJUHOLJLRXVEHOLHIVDUHLQWHJUDOWRKXPDQNQRZLQJDQGWKHUHIRUH
HGXFDWLRQ´  &RROLQJ¶V DQDO\VLV WKDW DOO ZRUOGYLHZV VKRXOG EH WUHDWHG µIDLUO\¶ PLJKW EH
lent to what Rowan Williams (2012) calls a procedural secularism in which a range of 
perspectives, religious and non-religious, form and inform the debate. A clue to the problem 
ZLWK&RROLQJ¶VDQDO\VLVOLHVZLWKKLVXVHRIWKHWHUPµZRUOGYLHZ¶)RU&RROLQJWKHTXHVWLRQLV
not whether religion should be conceived in terms of worldviews, but whether the idea of an 
                                                        
8 See Milbank 2010. 5RZDQ:LOOLDPVFDOOV0LOEDQN¶VWKHVLVRIDQLQQDWHYLROHQFHWRVHFXODULVP³D
striking reversal of the received wisdom of modernity, for which religion is the inherently violent 
presHQFHLQFXOWXUH´:LOOLDPV)0LOEDQN¶VSURYRFDWLYHWKHVLVPDNHVVHQVHRQO\LQWKHVHQVH
WKDW³LWWDNHVIRUJUDQWHGFRQWHVWVRISRZHUDVWKHEDVLFIRUPRIVRFLDOUHODWLRQ´:LOOLDPV 
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HGXFDWLRQWKDWLVµZRUOGYLHZQHXWUDO¶LVFRKHUHQW:RUOGYLHZQHXWUDOHGXFDWLRQLVDFFRUGLQJ
to Cooling, partisan, absorbing and reflecting the assumptions of a secular consumerist 
culture. In other words Cooling does not perceive or question the propositional framing of the 
debate itself. Both Cooling and Hand take different sides on an argument that does not 
question the nature of religion as belief in a set of doctrines or truth claims which amount to a 
worldview. One might say that Cooling and Hand share a metaphysical stance, an ontology, 
which is positivist, propositional and reductive. No wonder, then, that Cooling fails in the end 
WRFRQYLQFLQJO\UHSO\WR+DQG¶VFULWLFLVPV+DQG2) since Cooling is playing the game by 
the rules of the secular reduction of religion to the propositional.  
David Aldridge convincingly shows that the real problem here is that neither Hand nor 
Cooling are prepared to address the ontological significance of seeing a theoretical and 
explicit worldview as derivative of a prior ontological intentionality (Aldridge 2015, 180). 
Aldridge has in mind a Heideggerian analysis of being-in-the-world which I am very much 
sympathetic to. It is worth asking whether the propositional frame is straightforwardly 
HTXLYDOHQW WR +HLGHJJHU¶V SUH-understanding of being ± QRW WKDW +HLGHJJHU¶V RQWRORJLFDO
considerations can ever be described as straightforward. From a Heideggerian point of view, 
our intentionality is not something we do or something we can entirely thematize. As 
constitutive of the being of Dasein, our intentionality precedes us ± certainly preceding any 
cognitive intervention. The propositional frame moves in this direction, being neither 
something we do, nor something we can critically assess.  
In summary, the propositional framing of religion is a product of a history of being which 
invites a more thoroughgoing RQWRORJLFDO LQYHVWLJDWLRQ :LWKLQ WKH SUHVHQW µSURSRVLWLRQDO
RQWRORJ\¶WKHUHVXOWRIPXFKWKHRORJ\LV as Heidegger puts it ontotheology. This essentially 
refers to the reduction of religion to the present state of metaphysics which I have argued 
results in the propositional view of religion. The only way out seems to be an interruption to 
this ontology thRXJK,DPQRWVXUHZKHWKHUDµOLWXUJLFDOLQWHUUXSWLRQ¶ZLOOGR 
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